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INSTRUCTION NO. Jj 
In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definition in order 
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may 
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from 
the evidence. The definitions applicable to Count I, Violation of a Clandestine Laboratory Act, 
are as follows: 
11
 Clandestine laboratory operation1 means any of the following: 
a. purchase or procurement of chemicals, supplies, equipment, or laboratory 
location for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. 
b. transportation or the arranging for the transportation of chemicals, 
supplies, or equipment for the illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. 
c. setting up of equipment or supplies in preparation for the illegal 
manufacture of methamphetamine. 
d. illegal manufacture of methamphetamine. 
e. distribution or disposal of chemicals, equipment, supplies or products used 
in the manufacture of methamphetamine 
"Controlled substance precursors " include: 
a) pseudoephedrine 
b) crystal iodine 
c) ephedrine 
"Illegal manufacture of a controlled substance" means: 
the compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, extraction, or 
other physical or chemical processing for the purpose of producing 
methamphetamine or conversion of methamphetamine to its base form. 
INSTRUCTION NoXP 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine 
Laboratory Act, a first degree felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that in Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following elements of the 
crime 
1) Said defendant, James Deluna, 
2) a. knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance precursor with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
AND/OR 
b. knowingly or intentionally possessed laboratory equipment or supplies with 
the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
AND/OR 
c knowingly or intentionally conspired with or aided another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation 
AND 
3) one of the following conditions occurred in conjunction with the clandestine 
laboratory operation: 
a. the defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm; 
AND/OR 
b. the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 
500 feet of a residence, 
AND/OR 
c. the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance, 
AND/OR 
d. the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
methamphetamine base. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not guilty 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2J_ 
You may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation 
if the defendant: 
1) was in illegal possession of a controlled substance precursor; 
OR 
2) illegally possessed or attempted to illegally possess a controlled substance 
precursor AND is in possession of any one of the following pieces of equipment: 
a. glass reaction vessel, 
b. separatory funnel, 
c. glass condenser, 
d. analytical balance, or 
e. heating mantle. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2A 
If you find the Defendant, James Deluna, GUILTY of Count I, Violation of the 
Clandestine Laboratory Act, you must consider which enhancements apply to this case. If you 
found the Defendant, James Deluna, NOT GUILTY of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine 
Laboratory Act, then you should proceed to deliberate on the remain charges and disregard the 
remainder of this instruction. 
Assuming you have unanimously agreed that the Defendant, James Deluna, is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of Count I, Violation of the Clandestine Laboratory Act, the Court 
requires you to further deliberate on the specified enhancements. The Court requires you to 
determine as a group, beyond a reasonable doubt, which, if any, of the following conditions 
occurred in conjunction with this violation: 
a. the Defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm; and/or 
b. the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500 
feet of a residence; and/or 
c. the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of controlled 
substance, to wit: methamphetamine; and/or 
d. the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
methamphetamine base. 
After you decide beyond a reasonable doubt which, if any, of these enhancements apply to this 
case, you should complete the SPECIAL VERDICT form at the end of the instruction packet. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count II, Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, you must find from the evidence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that in Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1) Said Defendant, James Deluna, 
2) knowingly and intentionally, 
3) possessed a controlled substance, 
4) to wit: Methamphetamine. 
If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2JL 
"Possession " means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, 
retaining, belonging or maintaining of the items at issue and includes individual, joint or group 
possession of the items. 
For a person to be a possessor of an item, it is not required that he be shown to have 
individually possessed, used, or controlled the item, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he 
jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, possession or control of any item with 
knowledge that the activity was occurring. 
Actual physical possession is not necessary to convict a defendant of possessing certain 
items. A conviction may also be based upon "constructive possession. " 
"Constructive Possession " exists where the item is subject to the defendant's dominion 
and control. To find the defendant had "constructive possession" of a controlled substance, it is 
necessary to prove there was a sufficient nexus or connection between the accused and the 
controlled substance to permit an inference that the accused had both the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the item. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jj 
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Count III, Production of a Controlled 
Substance, a third degree, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that in 
Salt Lake County on or about February 5, 1999, all of the following elements of the crime: 
5) Said Defendant, James Deluna, 
6) knowingly and intentionally, 
7) produced or possessed with the intent to produce, 
8) a controlled substance, 
9) to wit: Marijuana 
If you believe that the evidence established each and all of the elements of this offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other hand, if the 
evidence failed to establish one or more of said elements, you should find the defendant not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. XL 
In these instructions certain words and phrases are used which require definition in order 
that you may properly understand the nature of the crimes charged and in order that you may 
properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find them from 
the evidence. The definitions applicable to Count III, Production of a Controlled Substance, are 
as follows: 
"Production " means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a 
controlled substance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that: 
Methamphetamine is a controlled substance. 
Marijuana is a controlled substance. 
Iodine is a precursor chemical. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J^JO 
A person engages in conduct intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, 
with respect to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense 
who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable 
as a party for such conduct. 
jtfj* INSTRUCTION NO, ' "*' ^ 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of 
mind and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state 
of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
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Case No. 991903035 
We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, have found the Defendant, James Deluna, 
GUILTY of Violation of the Clandestine Laboratory Act, as charged in the information. 
In so finding, we unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with this violation (check anv and all that apply): 
the Defendant, James Deluna, possessed a firearm; 
the intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place within 500 
feet of a residence; 
the clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of controlled 
substance; 
the intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
methamphetamine base. 
DATED this day of June, 2000. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, by and through its 
general partner, Robert D. Kent, 
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SUMERSET HOUSEBOATS, DIV. 
SMI; and JAMES E. SHARPE, JOHN 
DOES 1-10, 
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REPLY BRIE* til APPELLANT UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD. 
L INTRODUCTION 
Sumerset and Sharpe do not dispute that the parties consented to jury trial 
of UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim1 and Sharpe does not dispute that UTCOfs claims 
for promissory estoppel, breach of contract, and misrepresentation are alternative 
theories entitled to jury consideration because of differing proof burdens and elements. 
UTCO's Brief at 1VI6 Accordingly, UTCO will not discuss these issues further; Sharpe 
1
 Sharpe and Sumerset are sometimes collectively referred to as "Sharpe" based in part 
on the fact that the only contact which IJTCO had with Sumerset was through Sharpe. 
Civil No. 20000339-CA 
930904174 
Argument Priority 15 
and Sumerset have conceded them. Sharpe ignores the trial court's finding that mere 
similarity in the claims brought against Sharpe and Zimmerman (now discharged from 
bankruptcy) does not create "total" overlap in the facts of their disparate conduct that 
would preclude certification under Rule 54(b). Sharpe also forgets the trial court's 
finding that UTCO's "adequate remedy" at law was UTCO's breach of contract and 
misrepresentation claims in this case, not UTCO's claims against Zimmerman in 
bankruptcy. Finally, Sharpe's argument that the trial court properly excluded evidence of 
Sharpe's fraud is unpersuasive because fraudulent intent is shown by all surrounding facts 
and circumstances. 
II. JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED UNDER RULE 
54(B): THE FACTUAL OVERLAP WAS NOT COMPLETE 
AND UTCO PURSUED ALL CLAIMS TO JUDGMENT. 
Sharpe incorrectly challenges this Court's jurisdiction and the rule 54(b) 
order, saying that the claims against Zimmerman "overlapped" with and were not distinct 
or "separate" from claims against Sumerset and Sharpe under Kennecott Corp. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991). Sharpe Brief at 20-22. First, Sharpe 
ignores the trial court's finding that there was insufficient overlap to preclude rule 54(b) 
certification. The trial court rejected Sharpe's "overlap" claim, finding that: 
The Court determines that pursuant to Rule 54(b) and the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Kennecott Corp v. Utah 
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1991), 
there is no factual overlap preventing certification. For 
-2-
example, in the promissory estoppel allegations contained in 
the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleged separate 
actions by Zimmerman on the one hand and Sharpe and 
Sumerset on the other hand. 
R. 3211-12 (emphasis added). This put an end to Sharped "fact-overlap" challenge. 
Second, a complete reading of Kennecott undercuts Sharpe's juridiction 
challenge. The Kennecott Court hesitated to decide (lie rule >4(b) appeal because there 
was a total "overlap" in facts for both the certified claims and claims remaining at the trial 
court, and because the uncertified had not yet been resolved: 
Under the analytical approach we adopt today, the key 
question is whether there is factual overlap between the 
ostensibly separate claims. Here, the overlap is total. The 
taxpayers' claims are all based on the same underlying 
facts. . . . It would be a waste of judicial resources to have 
this court learn the facts of the case in order to determine the 
propriety of the trial court's decision under article XIII, 
section 5 of the Utah Constitution, when at a later time we 
would be forced to review a variant challenge to the same 
statute on the same facts. 
Kennecott. 814 P.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). 
This case is different. First, while each defendant here acted wrongfully, 
Zimmerman, Sharpe, and Sumerset did different things. The subject of Sharpens focus, 
UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim, confirms this. In that claim, UTCO alleged: 
"Zimmerman made promises to plaintiff to, among other things, make payments under 
the Note. Sharpe and Sumerset made promises to plaintiff to apply the Funds to the 
-3-
purchase of the Houseboat and to deliver the Houseboat to Zimmerman's place of 
business in Utah." Second Amended Complaint at f 51, 54 (emphasis added), R.568-69. 
A borrower's promise to make payments on a note is different from a manufacturer's 
promise to ship a houseboat to Utah when the lender sends the manufacturer the Funds. 
The trial court recognized these differences in certifying the matter under rule 54(b). See 
Certification Order, Addendum L, R. 3211-12. UTCO's claims against Sharpe arise 
from his separate unfulfilled promises to use the Funds for the purchase of the Houseboat 
and to ship it once Sumerset received the Funds from UTCO and Mr. Nelson. See 
Second Amended Complaint at ffi[12,13, 15,18, 19, 38-40, 51, 53, 64, 65,94-97. R. 563-
575. In sum, Sharpe's and Sumerset's liability results from their own acts, not the 
separate acts of Zimmerman. 
Second, while Zimmerman was not a party to the trial court's September 4, 
1996, Judgment, UTCO pursued him to final judgment in the bankruptcy court, which 
ultimately granted a discharge. R. 3165-68; 321 l(Trial court found "Zimmerman's 
bankruptcy has concluded and Zimmerman obtained a discharge.") The discharge 
precluded UTCO from pursing Zimmerman in this action. R. 3211 (Trial court found 
"that because of the discharge, the plaintiff has no further recourse against Zimmerman.") 
UTCO received partial compensation from Zimmerman during the bankruptcy action. R. 
3212, 3149-3164. UTCO's claims against him have been fully adjudicated and do not 
-4-
preclude jurisdiction. 1JTCO was entitled to appeal after its claims against Zimmerman 
were discharged in the bankruptcy court. Donohue v. Mouille. 913 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996) (court found that plaintiff must either certify the order, dismiss the 
codefendant who filed bankruptcy or seek relief from the automatic stay). 
Certification was consistent with Kennecott. The unresolved claims 
remaining in the trial court that frustrated certification efforts in Kennecott are not present 
here. Kennecott, 814 P.2d at 1105. All justiciable claims have been resolved either in the 
bankruptcy court or the trial court. See exhibits attached to UTCO's Memorandum in 
Support. R. 3149-68; R.3211-12. This appeal is all that remains.2 
Applying the prior rulings of this Court, the trial court Jou nil that its 
September 4,1996, Judgment should be certified, and granted UTCO's Rule 54(b) 
motion, finding: 
Based upon the certified copies of documents submitted by 
plaintiff, Zimmerman's bankruptcy has concluded and 
Zimmerman obtained a discharge. The documents from the 
bankruptcy demonstrate that plaintiffs claims against 
defendant Zimmerman have been adjudicated fully in the 
bankruptcy action and that because of the discharge, the 
plaintiff has no further recourse against Zimmerman . . . The 
2The trial court's decision is certifiable, as stated implicitly in this Court's prior 
decision: "the order does not dispose of the matters as to all parties, namely Zimmerman, 
it cannot be considered final and in the absence of a Utah R. Civ. P. 54 (¥) certification, 
this court has no authority to consider the appeal." UTCO v. Zimmerman. Case No. 
970190-CA dated April 30,1998, Memorandum Decision at 1, attached to Brief of 
Appellant as Addendum "K"(emphasis added). 
-5-
plaintiff does not have any claims remaining against 
Zimmerman. Plaintiffs claims against Zimmerman were 
adjudicated fully in the bankruptcy action and he has obtained 
a discharge. In the bankruptcy action, plaintiff pursued 
Zimmerman and obtained certain monies, but not a full 
recovery from Zimmerman. Because of Zimmerman's 
discharge, plaintiff may no longer pursue Zimmerman in this 
action. Finally, the Court determines that 'there is no just 
reason for delay' of the appeal. Therefore, based upon the 
record and for the reasons stated above and in plaintiffs 
memoranda, the Court grants the plaintiffs Motion and 
certifies the September 4, 1996 Judgment as a final judgment 
under Rule 54(b). 
R.3211-12. 
In sum, the September 4, 1996, Judgment and the order dismissing UTCO's 
promissory-estoppel claim were certified correctly under rule 54(b). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT 
UTCO'S ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW LAY IN UTCO'S 
BREACH OF CONTRACT AND MISREPRESENTATION 
CLAIMS. 
Sharpe conveniently speculates that the trial court intended UTCO's now-
discharged claims against Zimmerman to be the "adequate remedy at law/' when the 
court refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim. Sharpe Brief at 
22-23. Sharpe incorrectly suggests that this is inferred from Sharpe's reference to 
UTCOfs claims in bankruptcy court against Zimmerman in Sharpe's Motion for Directed 
-6-
Verdict.3 Sharpe Brief at 16, 23. First, the trial court denied the Motion for Directed 
Verdict, R. 2416, and allowed evidence on the promissory-estoppel claim. Sharpe 
defended the claim until the trial court sua sponte dismissed it at the close of the 
evidence, days after denying the Motion for Directed Verdict. R. 2416.4 
Second, the trial rourl never mentioned the Zimmerman bankruptcy when 
giving its reasons for taking the promissory-estoppel claim from the jury. R. 2606-07, 
The stated basis for dismissal left little to speculation; it was concern over double 
recovery and "surplusage". R MMh -07 The court said "that the concept of promissory 
estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that are being asserted in this case by the 
plaintiff And they'll just be surplusage." R.2606-07, emphases added. Thus, contrary 
to Sharped suggestion, the "adequate remedy at law" intended by the trial court lay in 
UTCO's claims for Sharpe's breach <>IYonliii< * wid misrepresentations, not claims in 
bankruptcy court against Zimmerman. 
3It is undisputed that the bankruptcy involved only Zimmerman and did not include 
UTCO's claims against Sumerset and Sharpe for breach of their promise to ship the 
Houseboat to Utah after receiving the Funds from UTCO. Sharpe and Sumerset argued 
repeatedly that UTCO's remedy was to assert claims against Zimmerman in the 
Zimmerman bankruptcy proceeding. R. 2400-01. The trial court flatly rejected this 
argument when presented in Sharpe and Sumerset's Motion for Directed Verdict, and the 
court stated the essence of UTCO's claim against Sharpe and Sumerset. R. 2396-97. 
4The argument on Sharpe's motion for directed verdict is found at R. 2389-2416. 
-7-
Sharpens "authorities" do not change this result. Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d 
1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), involved a claim for quantum meruit (not promissory 
estoppel) where the plaintiff had failed to exhaust two legal remedies. Unlike the plaintiff 
in Knight, UTCO pursued its claim against all defendants either in state court or 
bankruptcy court.5 The Knight Court was clear, noting that a bankruptcy action did not 
necessarily preclude recovery under a mechanics' lien nor toll the time for bringing an 
action to enforce the lien. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100 n.2 (citing Munson v. Risinger. 114 
So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App.1959)). Knight teaches that UTCO could, and was required to, 
pursue Sharpe in state court and Zimmerman in bankruptcy court simultaneously. Id. 
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah 
1977), is equally unhelpful to Sharpe. Sharpe Brief at 23. There, a materials supplier 
sued a tenant and landlord for the value of improvements, asserting unjust enrichment, 
not promissory estoppel. Sharpe cites Commercial Fixtures selectively, saying the Court 
5Sharpe also suggests that Knight requires proof that pursuit of claims in bankruptcy 
was fruitless and that UTCO presented no such evidence. Sharpe Brief at 24. However, 
as shown infra in Knight, the Supreme Court has required that actions against third parties 
must be filed within the appropriate statute of limitations for such actions. Knight 748 
P.2d at 1100 n.2 (citing Munson v. Risinger. 114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.CtApp.1959)). UTCO 
was pursuing its claims in the bankruptcy action and ultimately obtained certain monies 
from that proceeding. R. 3212. Further, Sharpens expert admitted that recovery of funds 
by UTCO was speculative because he did "not believe that there is any way to predict the 
percentage [of the estate] which UTCO may receive." R.2447. Knight is further 
distinguishable from the present case because the Knight plaintiff failed to assert legal 
rights in a quantum meruit action which rights were then lost by plaintiff. Knight, 748 
P.2d at 1100 (Citing Utschig v. McClone, 114 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1962). 
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should not imply a contract between UTCO and Sharpe where an express contract existed 
between UTCO and Zimmerman. See Sharpe Brief at 28. Sharpe ignores the crucial 
clarifying language in the opinion: 
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract 
between two others does not make such third person liable in 
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. See 66 Am. 
Jur.2d960. There must be some misleading act, request for 
services, or the like, to support such an action. 
Commercial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added). UTCO met this criteria. Sharpe 
and Sumerset committed "misleading acts" and made "requests for services and the like," 
which established UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim. Id. Indeed, the trial court 
summarized these actions: 
The Court: But, Mr. Atkin, Mr. Nelson, in his trust 
account, had Mr. Zimmerman's money. And that money 
came from a loan from UTCO. And part of the deal between 
Zimmerman and UTCO was that they [UTCO] would get a 
lien on this property. 
Now assuming for the sake of discussion, which, of 
course, we must do, that the testimony that's been offered that 
Mr. Sharpe said, you send me the money, I will ship you that 
boat, and the interest of the boat was going to be shipped 
immediately. It is not the money, it's the loss of the security 
interest. 
The Court: Mr. Nelson, wasn't told this boat wasn't 
built, according to him And that is the evidence to this point 
in time. 
-9-
Mr. Atkin: Well -
The Court: He thought the boat was built. He 
thought that as soon as the money got there they were going 
to put the boat on the truck and drive it here. 
R. 2396-97 (emphasis added). 
Sharpe then argued that UTCO was unharmed because the money sent by 
UTCO to Shaipe was Zimmerman's. Shaipe Brief at 30. The trial court also flatly 
rejected this: 
The Court: Mr. Atkin, what do you do, maybe I'm 
misguided here, but if someone makes you a promise and you 
do something in that regard to that promise, even shipping 
someone else's money, wiring somebody else's money, and 
that person doesn't do what they say they're going to do, it 
seems to me there's something wrong with that. 
Mr. Atkin: Well, there has to be — there has to be 
damages, your honor. There has to be a change of position by 
the plaintiff that would have caused damage or detriment to 
the plaintiff. And there just isn't any in this case. 
The Court: So that's your theory, there is no 
damages here? So Mr. Sharpe, in this case, if that's the 
evidence, at this point in time, it's that he made an intentional 
misrepresentation about shipping the boat immediately, that 
he hadn't even built, and that's just too bad. Is that the way 
we do business in this country? 
Mr. Atkin: Well, your honor, we have to look at who 
has standing to complain. And that's Mr. Zimmerman, who 
might have had some standing to complain. 
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The Court: He didn't make a promise to Mr. 
Zimmerman, he made it to Mr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson is the guy 
that had the money in his trust account, and he is the guy that 
decided whether the fifty-eight thousand was going to be sent. 
And I don't believe for a minute Mr. Nelson would have sent 
it but for the fact that he got a promise that there was a boat 
there to be shipped. There wasn't even a boat built. 
R. 2401-2403; see also K. DOJ, 041,2095, 2091-93, 2196-99,2278-79, 2077. Consistent 
with Commercial Fixtures, Sharpe's "misleading acts" and "request for services or the 
like" allowed UTCO's independent action against them. See also UTCO's Brief at 3-6, 
16-23. 
A. UTCO WAS ENTITLED TO PRESENT ALTERNATIVE 
THEORIES TO THE JURY. 
Promissory estoppel exists "to enable courts to enforce contract-like 
promises made iiiiciilorceable by technical defects or defenses." 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel 
and Waiver § 57 (2000). "[Promissory estoppel comes into play where the requisites of 
a contract are not met, yet the promise should be enforceable to avoid injustice." Id. 
Overlooking this, the trial court erroneously took UTCO's promissory-estoppel claim 
from the jury ostensibly because UTCO would have an adequate legal remedy if the jury 
found a valid contract. However, when the jury found no contract, no promissory-
estoppel claim remained for jury consideration. Thus, UTCO was deprived of a jury trial 
on a valid iilleniativv theory -promissory estoppel. 
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1. UTCO WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT BETWEEN ITS 
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES PRIOR TO A JURY 
VERDICT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
"ELECTING" FOR UTCO. 
Whatever ground the trial court advanced (whether the doctrines of 
"adequate remedy at law", election of remedies or "surplusage"), it was reversible error to 
elect sua sponte for UTCO which alternative remedy the jury could decide. UTCO was 
entitled to send breach of contract and promissory-estoppel claims to the jury.6 Not 
surprisingly, Sharpe cites no Utah case holding that breach of contract and promissory-
estoppel claims must be elected before the jury verdict is reached. Other courts allow the 
jury to decide both claims. See e.g., UFE Inc. v. Methode Electronics, Inc.. 808 F. Supp. 
1407, 1410 & 1415 (D. Minn. 1992) (after verdict for plaintiff on both promissory 
estoppel and breach of contract, trial and appellate court found evidence plaintiff 
"proffered to support its promissory-estoppel claim was the same evidence underlying its 
breach of contract claim" and "[b]ecause those claims are mutually exclusive as a matter 
of law, and because the jury found a . . . contract in fact, [plaintiffs] promissory-estoppel 
claims fail") (citing Del Haves & Sons, Inc. v. Mitchell. 230 N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn. 
1975) ('"[pjromissory estoppel is the name applied to a contract implied in law where no 
6The Court in Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P,2d 146, 146 (Utah 1962), stated, "To require 
a party to make an election between alternative counts . . . , particularly at the pretrial 
stage of the proceedings, would be to emasculate the rule [Rule 8(e), Utah R. Civ. P.] and 
to render it meaningless." 
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contract exists in fact; and thus doctrine is wholly inapplicable in situations where an 
actual contract exists") (parenthetical summary by the Court));) Innovative Material 
Systems. Inc. v. Santa Rosa Utilities. Inc., 721 So.2d 1233,1233 (Fla. Ct.,\pp 1998) 
("Pursuant to our rules of civil procedure, a party may assert inconsistent claims or 
defenses in a single pleading. An election between inconsistent remedies need only be 
made before the entry of judgment") (emphasis added); Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. 
Gray. 730 S.W.2d 796, 811 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) ("Under the doctrine of election of 
remedies, if a plaintiff pleads more than one theory of recovery, he need not make an 
election between them until after the verdict. He is entitled to the greatest relief under 
either theory that the verdict will support.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added) See 
generally Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United World Travel Ass'n 
(WTA). Inc.. 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979) (After judgment of lien foreclosure and 
judgments against lessor and lessee, Court found. "'It should of course be observed that 
while all possible avenues of relief may be pursued simultaneously, there can be but one 
satisfaction of the debt.") (emphasis added); Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 516-17 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("While Martindale is entitled to collect the amount of his judgment 
only once, the court could certainly enter both personal judgments and an order 
foreclosing the mechanic's lien, allowing Martindale the option of choosing his method 
for a single recovery.") (emphasis added); Council of and for the Blind of Delaware 
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County Valley. Inc. v. Regan. 709 F.2d 1521, 1550 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Mere 
existence of a remedy at law has not sufficed to warrant denial of equitable intervention: 
rather, as the [U.S.] Supreme Court has declared, 'the legal remedy both in respect to the 
final relief and the mode of obtaining it, [must be] as efficient as the remedy which equity 
would afford under the same circumstances.") (quoting Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338, 
349 (1890) (emphasis added)). In sum, the trial court incorrectly took UTCO's 
promissory-estoppel claim from the jury, over UTCO's objections.7 
7R. 2606-07; 2610-11. Sharpe cites Chartiers Valley School District v. Virginia 
Mansions Apartments, Inc., 489 A.2d 1381 (Penn. 1985) and Justice v. United States, 6 
F.3d 1474 (11th Cir. 1993) and argues that although UTCO's legal claims were 
unsuccessful they were nonetheless adequate. Sharpe Brief at 25-26. Chartiers involved 
a school district's pursuit of equitable remedies to recover a tax claim, though the city 
failed to pursue the statutorily-provided remedy for recovery of tax claims, the statute 
offered no equitable recovery of tax claims, and the statute of limitations had run. The 
court held: "[C]ourts of equity will not relieve a party from the consequences of an error 
due to his own ignorance or carelessness when there are available means which would 
have enabled him to avoid the mistake if reasonable care had been exercised." Id. at 
1391-92 (citations omitted). Here, UTCO pursued all its legal remedies and was not 
negligent. Chartiers is inapposite. In Justice, the case was dismissed without prejudice 
for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court orders after the statute of 
limitations had run. The plaintiff filed another action and argued that the statute was 
equitably tolled during his prior case. The court ruled equitable tolling did not apply 
because plaintiff could have continued in his original case by filing a motion to 
reconsider, a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, and an appeal of the dismissal. 
See id. at 1481. Sharpe cites a footnote in Justice quoting Thompson v. Allen Co., 115 
U.S. 550, 554 (1885). However, Thompson is readily distinguishable because plaintiff 
had a judgment, was granted a legal remedy, tried unsuccessfully to execute on the 
judgment, and then returned to court and requested an equitable remedy. See id. at 554. 
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Even without a "contract", UTCO could recover against Sharpe through 
promissory estoppel because UTCO reasonably relied on Sharpe's hollow promises to its 
detriment Ouagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders. 538 P.2d 301, 310 (Utah 1975) (Court 
held defense of no consideration "would avail nothing, because of the applicability of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel").8 IJTCO proved its promissory-estoppel claim, 
showing that Sharpe received the Funds based upon his promise to ship the Houseboat to 
Utah, a promise which he never kept. But because the trial court erroneously dismissed 
the claim, when the jury found no contract, R.1672, UTCO could not recover in equity, 
even though evidence established the promissory-estoppel claim I JTCO was and is 
entitled to a jury verdict on its promissory-estoppel claim. 
TV UTCO RELIED ON THE MISREPRESENTATION 
Citing no evidence or trial court ruling, Sharpe claims incredibly that they 
can just walk from their actions because UTCO never relied on their representations. 
8See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 ("A promise which the promisor 
should reasonably expect to induce action . . . on the part of the promisee . . . and which 
does induce such action . . . is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of 
the promise."); Heathcote Assoc, v. Chittenden Trust Co.. 958 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D. Vt. 
1997) ("Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to prevent 'injustice and 
unconscionable advantage1 where an exchange of promises did not create a binding 
contract.") (citations omitted) (Vermont follows Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90). 
Utah adopts the Restatement Second formulation of the doctrine. Andreason v. Aetna 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 175 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Promissory estoppel applies 
"only where there is no agreement, where the promise is gratuitous, and there is 
unbargained-for-reliance." Heathcote, 958 F. Supp. at 188. 
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Sharpe Brief at 21-24. They simply ask the Court to assume that the trial court found that 
UTCO's reliance was insufficient as a matter of law. This is baseless. R. 2606-07. The 
record is devoid of such an important ruling. R.2606-07. 
Further, Mr. Nelson testified unequivocally that UTCO would not have 
loaned the money if it did not believe that Sharpe and Sumerset would ship the 
Houseboat: 
Mr. Nelson: After we talked about those three things I 
then confirmed with him that if I would wire $58,384.00 that 
he would then ship the houseboat, as was our discussion. And 
he said yes. 
Q. That's important. You're very certain he said 
that to you? 
A. I'm as certain as I'm sitting here. And I was 
shocked when I heard him say today the conversation never 
took place. I would have never wired the money, which I did, 
and he received. I would have never wired the money if he 
hadn't agreed to what we just talked about. 
R. 2198-99. 
Mr. Nelson also confirmed that the arrangement with Zimmerman required 
that UTCO receive an invoice, the registration for the Houseboat (MSO) and wiring 
instructions from Sumerset as it had four times before. R. 2195-97, 2278-79. Mr. Nelson 
testified that on December 1, prior to closing the loan, he received from Sharpe the 
invoice and MSO describing the Houseboat and wiring instructions requiring UTCO to 
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send the Funds to be sent to Sharpe. R. 2195, Exhibits 7-9. And, Sharpe sent the MSO 
and invoice so UTCO could accurately describ i Houseboat in its loan documents with 
Zimmerman. R. 2184-85. Finally, Mr. Nelson testified that the parties did business on 
three prior occasions where UTCO received a security interest in the houseboats and then 
Sumerset sent them R 2196,2278-79. See also UTCO's Brief at 18-20; R. 563, 641, 
2095,2091-93, 2196-99, 2278-79, 2077. This puts av i to Sharpens claim that: "the 
undisputed evidence established that UTCO's decision to loan $60,000 to Mr. 
Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before the alleged promise." Sharpe Brief at 23. 
UTCO's evidence established reliance and entitled IJTCO to a jury verdict on 
promissory-estoppel. 
Finally, Sharpe suggests that because UTCO had loaned the money to 
Zimmerman, UTCO could have no interest in the Funds wired to Sharpe and therefore, 
UTCO suffered no harm. Sharpe's technical theory ignores the realities the evidence 
established. Zimmerman promised UTCO a $58,384 security interest in the Houseboat. 
R. 699-709, 2196-99, 2278-79. Sharpe's promise, as Sharpe admitted, induced UTCO to 
send the Funds to Sumerset. R. 2060-62, 2092-93. Sharpe testified that he had a "little 
trail going" or "course of dealing" with UTCO, whereby UTCO would send money and 
obtain an interest in a boat which had been or would be shipped by Sharpe to Utah. R. 
2092-93. Sharpe also admitted he never told Nelson that he would apply the $58,384 
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payment to the balance Zimmerman owed Sharpe on another boat. R. 2077. Shaipe also 
testified that when he was sending MSOs to Nelson, he understood that Nelson "would be 
using that as collateral on the boat" and that the MSO was required to license the boat in 
another state. R.2095. Finally, Sharpe admitted that the boat described in the MSO and 
other documents sent to Nelson "was never manufactured by Sumerset" R.2097-98. On 
cross-examination, Sharpe admitted that his answers to interrogatories established that the 
$58,384 was applied the same day it was received to the balance due on the other boat. 
R.2148-50; see also R.2196-2202. Finally, Mr. Nelson testified that he subsequently 
discovered that the boat with the serial number on the MSO Nelson received had been 
sold to someone else. R. 2210-11. 
In sum, UTCO's overwhelming evidence established that it was damaged 
because it relied on Sharpens promises and misrepresentations. Thus, UTCO 
convincingly established every element of its promissory-estoppel claim. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE 
SHOWING THAT SHARPE CHANGED SERIAL NUMBERS 
AND SOLD THE HOUSEBOAT TO ANOTHER PARTY, 
Sharpe does not question UTCO's authorities demonstrating that all 
surrounding circumstances in a fraud action must be viewed to assess fraudulent intent. 
See UTCO Brief at 20-23. Sharpe incorrectly suggests that the trial court used proper 
discretion to admit relevant evidence, Sharpe Brief at 31-33, and that UTCO only showed 
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a "technical violation of the hull identification statute" which, they say, is inadmissible 
under Utah R. Evid P! ules 402 and 403.9 Sharpe Brief at 37. Statutory violatioi is are 
proper for jury consideration in determining whether Sharpe committed fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation. See Ryan v. Gold Cross Services. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423,426 (Utah 1995) 
("It is a general rule of Utah law that violation of a safety standard set by statute or 
ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence.") (cited with approval in 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Inc.. 2000 UT 14, f 20,1 P.3d 528). 
That was not the only purpose of UTCO's evidence. UTCO was entitled to 
show that Sharpe reassigned the serial numbers to hide their fraud I'his Court has 
confirmed that, "[a] Court may look to ah of the surrounding facts and circumstances and 
a continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is one indicator of fraudulent intent " 
Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted); see also Bails v. Gar. 558 P.2d 458 (Mont. 1976) (holding that fraudulent intent 
must be determined in light of all surrounding circumstances); Ledbetter v. Webb. 711 
P.2d 874 (N.M. 1985) (holding that facts and circumstances surrounding a transaction 
may provide clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent intent). "The existence of 
fraudulent intent is a factual question, which may be inferred from all of the attendant 
inconsistently, Sharpe says: "No serial numbers were altered or changed", Sharpe 
Brief at 15, but later admits that he did "merely a reassignment on paper of a serial 
number to avoid a gap in serial numbers." Sharpe Brief at 37. Though the alteration has 
been admitted, Sharpe finds it more palatable to call it a "reassignment." 
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circumstances. It necessarily involves weighing the evidence presented and assessing the 
credibility of witnesses—tasks largely within the province of the fact-finder." Selvage v. 
JJ. Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (emphasis added).10 
Sharpe vigorously tried to keep out evidence showing the altered serial 
numbers, saying it lacked relevance because it occurred three months after the UTCO 
transaction.11 However, subsequent conduct supports an inference of prior intent not to 
fulfill a promise or representation. See, e^g., Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co.. 126 
Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). Ultimately, the very nature of fraud claims requires 
proof of all circumstances at all times f,[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be inferred 
from all facts and circumstances . . . including subsequent conduct." Garden State 
Standardbred Sales Co. v. Seese. 611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis 
added). 
"Citing In re Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); State v. Delanev. 869P.2d4, 
6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
aflPd 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
nSharpe sought support in State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), 
saying simply that fraud claims like other claims are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Sharpe Brief at 26-27; 31-32. However, Winward decided an issue in a 
criminal forgery case where the trial court erred in assuming that the State would 
ultimately establish that victims had been defrauded by defendant's forgery of a check 
made payable to someone other than the victims. Winward, 909 P.2d at 913. Here, 
Sharpe's acts prove the fraud perpetrated against UTCO directly, not via a third party. 
Winward is therefore inapposite. 
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Sharpe also alleged that evidence of changing the serial numbers was 
excluded i • . :d have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. But in 
Utah, the exclusion of evidence under rule 403 is reviewed under a harmful error 
standard: M f[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute 
reversible error unless the error is harmful.'" Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations. Inc.. 927 
P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. Citv of St. George, 898 
P.2d 1372,1378 (Utah 1995)). Harmful error occurs where "the likelihood of a different 
outcome in the absence of the error is 'sufficiently high so as to undermine confidence in 
the verdict.1 " Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Knight, 7341' ! M3, 920 (T Jfc ill 1987)). 
Harmful error occurred here. The following evidence was admitted: 
1. A houseboat matching the MSO and invoice sent by Sharpe was 
never constructed by Sumerset; R. 565, 643,2097-98; 
2. The Houseboat did not even exist when Sharpe received UTCO's 
$58,384 though Sharpe promised to send the Houseboat after receiving the Funds, R. 565, 
643, 2097-98; 
3. The Houseboat whose serial number appears on the invoice and 
MSO given to UTCO was sold to another person, R.2211. 
While UTCO's evidence of the altered numbers is compelling, even 
damning evidence, that should had been laid before the jury, confirming Sharpe's 
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fraudulent intent, and completing UTCO's claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. Preclusion of evidence from which Sharpens fraud may be inferred 
created prejudicial harm to UTCO. Confidence in the jury verdict is undermined by the 
exclusion of evidence of Sharpens fraud. The jury's reaction would be predictable; the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. 
In sum, evidence of Sharpe's and Sumerset's fraudulent intent — shown also 
by the altered serial number and subsequent sale of the second houseboat — was not only 
relevant but necessary to UTCO's fraud claim. Excluding the evidence was highly 
prejudicial, and constitutes reversible error. UTCO is entitled to a new trial on its claims 
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, UTCO requests that the trial court's judgment be 
vacated, and that this action be remanded for proceedings on UTCO's causes of action for 
promissory estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages. 
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